On April 19, 2024, Pennsylvania Attorney General Michelle Henry charged Shell Pipeline Company LP with 13 misdemeanor charges for failure to report or underreporting industrial waste releases during the construction of the Falcon Pipeline in Pennsylvania.
Key Findings
Underreporting spills allowed Shell to avoid approximately $40,000/day in stand-by pay to their contractors.
Discrepancies in reported drilling mud spills speaks to the irresponsible behavior and lack of transparency exhibited during the construction of the Falcon Pipeline.
The preliminary hearing at the Washington County Magisterial court was scheduled for May 20, 2024, but it has been rescheduled for August 1, 2024.
Falcon Pipeline Criminal Complaint Incidents
This interactive map shows the location of incidents described in the Office of the Attorney General’s April 2024 Criminal Complaint against Shell Pipeline LP.
View the map “Details” tab on the right side of the legend box to learn more and see the data sources, or click on the map to explore the dynamic version of this data.
View Full Size Map | Updated 6/01/2024 | Map Tutorial
Overview
The 97-mile Falcon Pipeline travels through southwestern Pennsylvania, eastern Ohio, and the West Virginia panhandle to connect three major ethane sources from Houston, Pennsylvania, Scio, Ohio, and Cadiz, Ohio, to the Shell Chemical Appalachia Petrochemical Complex located in Beaver County, Pennsylvania. Ethane is a volatile natural gas that is captured during fracking, which can be used to manufacture plastic. The construction of the Falcon Pipeline started in early 2019, and its utilization began in November 2022.
Kirk Jalbert started monitoring the Falcon in December 2016, creating an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) project to involve residents in public monitoring and to provide analyses of the environmental and public health impacts of the pipeline’s construction. Documents obtained through a public records request from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency submitted by former FracTracker Alliance employee Erica Jackson in 2020 revealed 250,000 gallons of drilling fluid was spilled over 70 events during construction.
In March 2021, FracTracker obtained documents from the Pennsylvania DEP revealing that the Falcon was under investigation by the DEP, the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General (OAG), the Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Our press release and timeline of related events can be found here. In 2022, the Pennsylvania DEP executed a consent assessment of civil penalty against Shell Pipeline Company LP and their contracting company Minnesota Limited LLC for violations of the Falcon’s construction permit and Pennsylvania laws and regulations.
On April 19, 2024 Pennsylvania Attorney General Michelle Henry charged Shell Pipeline Company LP with thirteen misdemeanor charges for failure to report and/or false-reporting of industrial waste releases to the DEP during the construction of the Falcon. The potential pollution caused by the spills violates the Clean Streams Law (Title 25 Pa Code §78a.68a(i)). Shell spokeswoman Virginia Q. Sanchez said the company is “reviewing the complaint and has been in contact” with the Attorney General’s office.
Criminal Charges
The criminal charges address incidents that occurred between April 2019 and August 2020 along the 45 miles of the Falcon that travels through Washington, Allegheny, and Beaver Counties in Pennsylvania.The incidents document two types of spills, losses of circulation (LOC) underground, and inadvertent returns (IR) aboveground that occurred during the process of horizontal directional drilling (HDD) that is used to create the path of the pipeline underground (Table 1; Figure 1). Sixteen HDDs were executed within Pennsylvania during the Falcon’s construction.
Table 1. Pipeline Construction Definitions
Term | Definition |
Horizontal directional drilling (HDD) | Trenchless construction method used to install pipes underground without disturbing the ground surface. The drill is launched from one end of the designed bore path and retrieved at the other end, and except for the launch and retrieving spaces above ground, the entire process takes place underground, out of sight. HDD has become a choice alternative to conventional pipe-laying methods that require opening up the earth’s surface up to the depth of installation for the entire pipeline route. Horizontal directional drilling is ideal for use where trenching needs to be avoided such as under a railroad, an embankment, highway, and beneath lakes and rivers. With advanced HDD steering technology, it is also now possible to install pipelines under busy city streets without disrupting the flow of traffic and affecting businesses. |
Loss of Circulation (LOC) | Loss of drilling mud underground and into the rock formation during drilling operations. Mud loss is noticed when there is a lack of drilling mud returning to the surface into the predetermined entry or exit pits. |
Inadvertent Return (IR) | Unintended surfacing of drilling mud to the surface of the ground, outside of the entry or exit pit during boring machine operations. |
Drilling fluid or drilling mud | Mix of water and other components, such as bentonite, that helps a bore maintain its shape throughout the boring process while loosening the material you’re drilling through |
Source: Trenchlesspedia.com
Figure 1. Horizontal Directional Drilling (HDD) Diagram. Source: Enbridge Pipeline
Shell Pipeline Company LP is officially the defendant in this case, but their pipeline construction subcontractor Minnesota Limited LLC (co-permitee) and the HDD subcontractor Ellingson Trenchless are also mentioned in the charges. The criminal charges include seven counts of unlawful conduct under the Clean Streams Law, three counts of prohibition against discharge of industrial wastes, and three counts of prohibition against other pollutions (Table 2).
The Inadvertent Return (IR) Plan established between Shell and the DEP as a precondition for their construction permit approval stated:
“Shell is required to notify the DEP of any IRs, regardless of the amount of drilling fluid that surfaces. At a certain IR volume, Shell is required to notify the DEP and cease drilling operations until DEP approves a re-start report. These conditions are as follows:
- IR of 200 gallons or greater, defined as an upland area with no surface waters or wetlands.
- An IR of 50 gallons or greater in an area with surface waters or wetlands.
- A 2nd or subsequent IR of any quantity into surface waters or wetlands.”
The project encountered multiple incidents that warranted reporting or shut-downs under these criteria.
Table 2. Offense Descriptions from the April 2024 Criminal Complaint
Offense | Offense Description |
Offense #1 | On April 22, 2019, during the construction of the Shell Falcon Pipeline, the Defendant, Shell Pipeline Company LP, did negligently hinder the department by failing to report a 21,000 gallon LOC at the Houston #7 HDD, as required under Title 25 Pa Code §78a.68a(i) |
Offense #2 | On April 24, 2019, April 25, 2019, and May 9, 2019, during the construction of the Shell Falcon Pipeline, the Defendant, Shell Pipeline Company LP, did negligently hinder the department by failing to report multiple IRS at the Houston #2 HDD, as required under Title 25 Pa Code §78a.68a(i)On April 24, 2019, April 25, 2019, and May 9, 2019, during the construction of the Shell Falcon Pipeline, the Defendant, Shell Pipeline Company LP, did negligently hinder the department by failing to report multiple IRS at the Houston #2 HDD, as required under Title 25 Pa Code §78a.68a(i) |
Offense #3 | On July 7, 2019, during the construction of the Shell Falcon Pipeline, the Defendant, Shell Pipeline Company LP, did negligently hinder the department by failing to report a 50 gallon IR at the Houston #10 HDD, as required under Title 25 Pa Code §78a.68a(i) |
Offense #4 | From September 28, 2019 to November 7, 2019, during the construction of the Shell Falcon Pipeline, the Defendant, Shell Pipeline Company LP, did negligently hinder the department by failing to report multiple IRS at the Houston #1 HDD, as required under Title 25 Pa Code §78a.68a(i) |
Offense #5 | On February 3, 2020, during the construction of the Shell Falcon Pipeline, the Defendant, Shell Pipeline Company LP, did negligently hinder the department by failing to report a 19,116 gallon LOC at the Houston #8 HDD. On May 13, 2020, Shell Pipeline Company LP failed to report a 2,800 gallon IR at the Houston #8 HDD, as required under Title 25 Pa Code §78a.68a(i) |
Offense #6 | On February 25, 2020, during the construction of the Shell Falcon Pipeline, the Defendant, Shell Pipeline Company LP, did negligently hinder the department by failing to report a 200 gallon IR at the Houston #3 HDD. On August 4, 2020, Shell Pipeline Company LP did fail to report a 6,184 gallon LOC at the Houston #3 HDD, as required under Title 25 Pa Code §78a.68a(i) |
Offense #7 | During the construction of the Shell Falcon Pipeline, the Defendant, Shell Pipeline Company LP, did negligently discharge drilling fluid, an industrial waste, into waters of the Commonwealth on April 22, 2019 and May 29, 2019 at the Houston #7 HDD. The Shell Pipeline Company LP experienced two (2) IRS at this location, resulting in a release of drilling fluids to two (2) UNTs to Potato Garden Run, (S-PA-160405-JLK-001 and S-PA-161205-WRA-001) and a wetland (W-PA-160405-JLK-001) |
Offense #8 | During the construction of the Shell Falcon Pipeline, the Defendant, Shell Pipeline Company LP, did negigently [sic] allow or permit the discharge of drilling fluid, a substance resulting in pollution, into waters of the Commonwealth on April 22, 2019 and May 29, 2019 at the Houston #7 HDD. The Shell Pipeline Company LP experienced two (2) IRs at this location, resulting in a release of drilling fluids to two (2) UNTs to Potato Garden Run, (S-PA-160405-JLK-001 and S-PA-161205-WRA-001) and a wetland (W-PA-160405-JLK-001) |
Offense #9 | During the construction of the Shell Falcon Pipeline, the Defendant, Shell Pipeline Company LP, did negigently [sic] discharge, permit to flow, or continue to discharge or permit to flow drilling fluid, an industrial waste, into waters of the Commonwealth on July 22, 2019 at the Houston #9 HDD. The Shell Pipeline Company LP experienced an IR at this location, resulting in a release of drilling fluids to Raccoon Creek (S-PA-15103-MRK-002) and a wetland (W- PA-151013-MRK-003) |
Offense #10 | During the construction of the Shell Falcon Pipeline, the Defendant, Shell Pipeline Company LP, did negigently [sic] allow or permit the discharge of drilling fluid, a substance resulting in pollution, into waters of the Commonwealth on July 22, 2019, at the Houston #9 HDD. The Shell Pipeline Company LP experienced an IR at this location, resulting in a release of drilling fluids to Raccoon Creek, (S-PA-15103-MRK-002) and a wetland (W-PA-151013-MRK-003) |
Offense #11 | During the construction of the Shell Falcon Pipeline, the Defendant, Shell Pipeline Company LP, did negigently [sic] discharge, permit to flow, or continue to discharge or permit to flow drilling fluid, an industrial waste, into waters of the Commonwealth on September 20, 2019, at the Houston #11 HDD. The Shell Pipeline Company LP experienced an IR at this location, resulting in a release of drilling fluids to a wetland (W-PA-151123-JKL-001) |
Offense #12 | During the construction of the Shell Falcon Pipeline, the Defendant, Shell Pipeline Company LP, did negigently [sic] allow or permit the discharge of drilling fluid, a substance resulting in pollution, into waters of the Commonwealth on September 20, 2019, at the Houston #11 HDD. The Shell Pipeline Company LP experienced an IR at this location, resulting in a release of drilling fluids to a wetland (W-PA-151123-JLK-001) |
Offense #13 | From April 2019 to on/about November 2019, during the construction of the Shell Falcon Pipeline, the Defendant, Shell Pipeline Company LP, did fail to comply with the DEP permit conditions which required real-time data logging capabilities on the HDD drilling rigs operated by Ellingson Trenchless, as per the HDD IR Plan |
Horizontal Directional Drilling (HDD), loss of circulation (LOC), inadvertent return (IR), unnamed tributary (UNT). Sourced from the April 2024 Criminal Complaint.
Incident Locations and Affected Waterways
It is difficult to assess the potential impact that the IRs and LOCs pose as many of the charges describing affected streams and wetlands do not list the amount of mud discharged. Drilling mud contains water, chemical additives, and bentonite clay (sodium montmorillonite). It is considered nontoxic, but if large amounts of the drilling mud are released into waterways the heavy sediment can harm aquatic life and impact drinking water. The potential for the Falcon to impact waterways presented a high risk as the pipeline planned to intersect 319 streams and 174 wetlands. Waterways of particular concern include the Ambridge Reservoir, which provides drinking water for 30,000 people. The spill in this watershed was the smallest reported, allegedly totaling only 50 gallons. Raccoon Creek was also listed as an affected waterway in the criminal charges. Raccoon Creek flows into the Ohio River, which provides drinking water for 5 million people.
The events and locations named in the criminal charges (Table 3) are largely encompassed in FracTracker’s 2020 map and report. According to a public records request submitted by FracTracker employee Erica Jackson in 2020, during the Falcon’s construction in Pennsylvania, there were 34 loss of circulation events totaling 172,116 gallons of drilling fluid and 18 inadvertent return events totaling 5,546 gallons of drilling fluid. Previously reported spills at locations including Houston #4 HDD, Houston #5 HDD, Houston #6 HDD, Houston #16 HDD, Scio #4 HDD, Scio #5 HDD, Gums Run, Frames Run, Millers Run, and Westland Run were not addressed by the criminal charges.
A 2022 civil penalty fining Shell for $670,000 highlighted 27 violations associated with negative impacts to 23 Pennsylvania waterways including Raccoon Creek, Service Creek, Gums Run, Frames Run, Ambridge Reservoir, Haden Creek, Mill Creek, Potato Garden Run, Raredon Run, Millers Run, Westland Run, Robinson Run, and the Ohio River. Not all the locations and dates named in the October penalty are encompassed within the criminal charges, either. The discrepancies that are apparent in the different IR and LOC sources speak to the lack of proper recordkeeping and transparency exhibited during the construction of the Falcon.
Table 3. April 2024 Criminal Complaint Incidents Compared to the 2020 FracTracker Report
Location Name | Date | Event | Gallons | Latitude | Longitude | Included in the 2020 FracTracker report? |
Houston #1 HDD | 9/28/2019-11/7/2019 | IR | multiple, unknown | 40.304894 | -80.267856 | Yes, amounting to 691 gallons over 4 IRs occurring from 9/30-10/21/2019. Also described 2 LOCs (53,387 gallons) occurring between 9/28-10/2/2019 |
Houston #2 HDD | 4/24/2019 | IR | multiple, unknown | 40.328610 | -80.261940 | Yes, amounting to 150 gallons during 1 IR |
Houston #2 HDD | 4/25/2019 | IR | multiple, unknown | 40.328610 | -80.261940 | Yes, amount unknown |
Houston #2 HDD | 5/9/2019 | IR | multiple, unknown | 40.328610 | -80.261940 | Yes, amounting to 75 gallons during 1 IR |
Houston #3 HDD | 2/25/2020 | LOC | 200 | 40.359549 | -80.272503 | No |
Houston #3 HDD | 8/4/2020 | LOC | 6,184 | 40.359549 | -80.272503 | No |
Houston #7 HDD | 4/22/2019 | LOC | 21,000 | 40.463818 | -80.289227 | No |
Houston #7 HDD | 4/22/2019 or 5/29/2019 | 2 IR | unknown | 40.463818 | -80.289227 | Yes, amounting to 1,800 gallons. Also describes 4 LOCs amounting to 5,740 gallons occurring from 4/5-4/20/2019 and 2 additional IRs occuring on 5/7/2019 and 6/25/2019 amounting to 70 gallons |
Houston #8 HDD | 2/3/2020 | LOC | 19,116 | 40.520260 | -80.309123 | Yes, previously reported as lasting until 2/4/2020 amounting to 4,538 gallons. Three other LOCs described occurring between 1/28-2/8/2020 amounting to 14,685 gallons |
Houston #8 HDD | 5/13/2020 | IR | 2,800 | 40.520260 | -80.309123 | No |
Houston #9 HDD | 7/22/2019 | IR | unknown | 40.551372 | -80.316977 | Yes, amounting to 500 gallons. There was also a LOC reported on 7/17/2019 amounting to 300 gallons |
Houston #10 HDD | 7/7/2019 | IR | 50 | 40.579440 | -80.326670 | Yes, though the date was previously reported as 7/9/2019 |
Houston #11 HDD | 9/20/2019 | IR | unknown | 40.625000 | -80.347889 | No, but two LOCs were reported on 8/23/2019 and 8/26/2019 totalling 10,600 gallons and an IR was reported on 9/21/2019 amounting to 800 gallons |
Potato Garden Run UNT (S-PA-160405-JLK-001) | 4/22/2019 or 5/29/2019 | 2 IR | unknown | 40.463641 | -80.289118 | Yes, though the date was previously reported as 5/2/2019 |
Raccoon Creek (S-PA-15103-MRK-002) | 7/22/2019 | IR | unknown | 40.550925 | -80.316628 | Yes, though the date was previously reported as 10/22/2019 |
Wetland near Potato Garden Run (W-PA-160405-JLK-001) | 4/22/2019 or 5/29/2019 | 2 IR | unknown | 40.463841 | -80.289544 | No |
Wetland near Raccoon Creek (W-PA-151013-MRK-003) | 7/22/2019 | IR | unknown | 40.551341 | -80.317159 | No |
Wetland near Houston #11 (W-PA-151123-JKL-001) | 9/20/2019 | IR | unknown | 40.625946 | -80.347361 | No |
Horizontal Directional Drilling (HDD), loss of circulation (LOC), inadvertent return (IR), unnamed tributary (UNT). Location Name, Date, Event, and Gallons columns are sourced from the April 2024 Criminal Complaint. The Latitude, Longitude, and data in the Included in the 2020 FracTracker report? columns were sourced from FracTracker’s 2020 report based off of our public records request from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection and the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency.
Investigation Details
The criminal charges are based on the testimony of whistleblowers named Frank Jacob Chamberlin IV and his spouse Susan D’Layne Carite and the subsequent investigation that their testimony initiated. Chamberlin and Carite worked on the pipeline as HDD Inspectors. The couple first contacted PHMSA and the DEP in 2019. In his testimony Chamberlin wrote “we did our jobs, and we were harassed, abused, ridiculed, and humiliated then released because we would not follow the bad seeds that are giving the industry a very bad reputation.” Chamberlin provided text messages, documents, and photos as evidence.
According to the charge document, the OAG, Environmental Crimes Section assumed jurisdiction over the matter on October 16th, 2019. Between December 2019 and February 2024, the OAG interviewed 29 individuals connected to the construction of the Falcon Pipeline (Table 4). Interviewees included HDD inspectors, Ellingson Trenchless employees, Shell project managers, and DEP staff. Interviewees were questioned about whose responsibility it was to report IRs and LOCs, whether they were aware of an IR reporting agreement with the DEP, whether they had been told to minimize IRs and LOCs, and whether they acknowledged the terms like “controlled release” or “managed return.”
Table 4. Interview Testimony Summary from the April 2024 Criminal Complaint
Date | Name | Position | Testimony Summary |
12/5/2019;
5/14/2020 |
Sean Arnold Larson | former HDD Coordinator for the Falcon Pipeline | Larson was fired from his position on 9/16/2019. He indicated that his suggestions for proactive measures to prevent IRs and LOCs were often ignored, leading to preventable incidents. He reported that in the event of an IR or LOC Ellingson Trenchless would be paid $40,000/day in stand-by pay. With this provision “…there was no motivation to do the right thing.” Larson claims Doug Scott (Shell Project Manager) told him “… the less we give them (DEP), the better off we are.” Larson claimed there was chronic under-reporting to the DEP, and he believes he was fired from the project for being “too open and honest with the DEP.”
In a second interview, Larson indicated an unspoken understanding among HDD inspectors to minimize the volume of a release to reduce downtime. He claimed that “…when Doug Scott came on as the new Project Manager, things went bad,” and described a warning from Doug Scott: “I’m not going to let you have the DEP jeopardize this project.” Larson stated that he was responsible for reporting IRs and LOCs to the DEP, but the reports were maintained by Eric DeLong and were inaccessible to inspectors after submission. Larson was questioned as to whether DeLong said “…don’t put anything bad in reports,” to which Larson responded: “Yeah, I heard him say that all the time. That, and keep your opinions out of your reports.” |
12/5/2019 | Erica Lillian Kasundra | Regional Project Manager for Shell in a Senior Pipeline Engineering role | Kasundra filed an ethics complaint alleging that Minnesota Limited LLC was under-reporting fluid losses to the DEP. After her complaint, she claimed “I was cut out of the loop” of daily leadership meetings. She advised that shutdowns cost Shell approximately $40,000 per day in stand-by pay provisions. Kasundra believes that Eric DeLong was responsible for the bulk of non-reporting and under-reporting to the DEP. She referred to Long as “…a negative personality, not a problem solver.” |
3/10/2020 | Frank Jacob Chamberlin IV | former HDD Environmental Inspector for the Falcon Pipeline | Chamberlin was one of the initial whistleblowers. He was fired from his position on 5/9/2019. He described how multiple employees were required to meet and come to an agreement on the volume spilled in the event of an IR, and after disputing an under-reported volume “…from that day forward, I was given the cold shoulder from the other inspectors.” He remembered vacuum trucks onsite that attempted to contain a release at HDD #2 that Chamberlin estimated was at least 1,500 gallons but “… Sean (Larson) said to make it 75 gallons.” Chamberlin claimed the HDD Environmental Lead Eric DeLong and the HDD Utility Lead Sean Larson were the officials responsible for the under-reporting. He advised that the motivation for under-reporting was to avoid costly shutdowns. |
7/15/2020 | Thomas Lowell Larson | HDD Environmental Inspector | He stated that his brother, Sean Larson, was responsible for reporting IRs and LOCs to the DEP. He criticized Ellingson Trenchless for their disregard for the IR Plan, stating “… Ellingson didn’t follow the IR Plan. They thought it was a joke. They didn’t adhere to it even after Sean shut them down several times.” Larson said he believed that shutdowns due to IRs and/or LOCs were preventable if Ellingson had been proactive. |
7/16/2020 | Susan D’Layne Carite | former HDD Environmental Inspector | Carite was one of the initial whistleblowers, and is the spouse of Frank Chamberlin. She was fired from her position on 5/9/2019. Carite reported that company officials attempted to minimize several IRs, and that she was instructed to report an IR volume as less than she had personally observed. She claimed she was redirected from a HDD site by Eric Delong because “…he didn’t want me to see the size of the IR. From what I could see from the entrance, it went from the entrance to the pond, into a wetland, over a series of rocks, to the other side of the wetland, and into a stream.” Carite also noted that the Construction Manager Greg Wilson left his reports intentionally vague and did not highlight problems. |
9/23/2020 | Unnamed | Water Quality Specialist (WQS) within the Bureau of Waterways and Wetlands at the DEP SWRO | They stated that the DEP was unaware of problems on the project until a whistleblower complaint was filed by Frank Chamberlin in mid-2019, alleging under-reporting and non-reporting of IRs. The WQS requested daily and weekly logs from Shell in response. The WQS noted several instances of IRs that were either under-reported or not reported at all after a comparison of Chamberlin’s evidence and the logs, and suspected that Shell and/or Ellingson Trenchless made the financial decision to continue drilling and not report IRs to avoid shutdowns that Shell considered costly. In a November 2019 meeting between the DEP and Eric Delong concerning delayed reporting, Delong argued, “…if an IR happens in the same spot, that’s expected. It’s not an IR anymore, it’s a controlled release.” The WQS explained that they had not heard this term used before, and confirmed that this term was not in the IR plan. Describing a visit by the WQS to Houston #2 HDD, they stated “… the workers went ahead and started without the required meters, the workers were unaware they needed them,” and “…the workers on the drill didn’t know the IR plan.” The WQS heard that the reason Sean Larson was later fired was because “…he lost his temper and had anger issues.” The WQS also mentioned that there was disagreement with Shell and the DEP over what constituted a “significant” LOC in the IR plan, with the DEP ultimately deciding on a threshold of 5,000 gallons (Shell argued for 10,000 gallons). |
9/23/2020 | Unnamed | Supervisor within the Bureau of Waterways and Wetlands Program at the DEP SWRO | They indicated that Shell had issues with transparency and that discrepancies were found in the reporting of IRs after the whistleblower complaint was lodged by Frank Chamberlin concerning Houston HDD #2. The DEP obtained a text from April 24th, 2019 date sent by Eric DeLong, which reads “… Sean says to keep it under 200 gallons,” describing an IR that was “30 gallons each time and re-occurring,” later instructing “Keep up with it and keep cleaning.” According to the Supervisor, all IRs and LOCs were supposed to be reported individually. The Supervisor also noted it was their opinion that Shell coined the term “managed” and/or “controlled” release to excuse their non-reporting behavior, as these are not industry terms. Larson immediately contacted the Supervisor after he was fired to voice his concerns, during which he explained his spreadsheet developed to count fluid losses. He suspected that while Shell reported that his termination was due to hostility, this was pre-text and the real reason was because he was tracking fluid losses and attempting to stop the operation at the appropriate thresholds. The supervisor suspected that Shell looked at the costs versus the benefits when an incident happened and decided to continue drilling and “…wait and see if they got caught.” After a meeting between Shell and the DEP where they again used the term “controlled” release, the DEP asked for clarification and Heather Brewster from AECOM responded, attempting to explain the term. The IR plan for the Shell Falcon Pipeline underwent at least eight revisions, and the “vague” protocol regarding measurement of an IR was a point of contention. The DEP issued seven Notices of Violation to the Shell Falcon Pipeline for various infractions, which were described as “…more egregious than the other pipelines.” |
3/17/2021 | Eric Scott DeLong | Lead Environmental Inspector on the Shell Falcon Project | DeLong confirmed that he took over reporting IRs and LOCs to the DEP after Sean Larson was fired and that he was trained in the IR plan. Larson reported to Mary Gerschefski. He recalled that the process used for measuring the volume of IRs was typically a visual estimation then later the DEP requested that they use measuring tape. DeLong reiterated details previously recounted by other interviewees such as the threshold for a LOC being set at 5,000 gallons and that shut downs cost Shell at least $40,000/day. He said “As long as it [IR] went to containment and was being removed [vacuumed], drilling could continue per Shell’s guidance,” naming Heather Brewster, Mary Gerschefski, Sean Larson and Lane Greenwalt as those who interpreted the IR plan and instructed him that drilling could continue during IRs as long as it stayed under 200 gallons of total accumulation. He claimed that he was not informed that weekly reports had to be submitted on a weekly basis, He also mentioned that the term “controlled release” or “managed return” was first discussed by Heather Brewster, Mary Gerschefski, Scott Adams, and Sean Larson. |
6/13/2022 | Heather Lynn Brewster | Senior Project Manager with AECOM, Environmental Consultant on the Falcon Pipeline | Brewster was involved in assisting with technical issues on the pipeline including HDD issues or erosion concerns. She believed that Doug Scott (Project Manager) would make decisions regarding LOCs, IRs, and work stoppages. She conveyed that Doug Scott and Scott Adams “… were the most concerned with work stoppages.” She recalled that she had first heard the term “managed release,” used by Eric DeLong at a Shell meeting in advance of a DEP meeting to describe “…an IR which is continuing to occur, with BMPs [best management practices] in place, and a vac-truck on scene containing the spill.” |
6/29/2022 | Casey Ann Talento | Project Manager for Environmental Compliance with AECOM | Talento performed high-level permit and project assessment review. Her group only handled the pipeline portion, with Shell opting for more direct control of HDD operations. She recalled hearing the term “controlled collection,” used to describe a continuing IR, which she said was not in the HDD Manual compiled by AECOM for the Shell Falcon Pipeline. Talento testified that she wasn’t trained in the HDD Plan or IR responses, and wasn’t in a position to determine if an incident was reportable. |
9/6/2022 | Todd James Weed | HDD Environmental Inspector | Weed reported “… Sean (Larson) was trying to hold contractors accountable to the conditions in the permits. Minnesota Limited never worked in Pennsylvania. They had guys from North and South Dakota, who did whatever they wanted to. No conditions on the drills. It was an adjustment for them. Pennsylvania has tighter regulations.” He acknowledged being trained on the IR plan when hired, but stated “IRs got out of control. In the beginning, The HDD Inspectors weren’t allowed in the drill cab, and the drillers were just continuing to run in spite of the losses.” Sean Larson, his immediate supervisor, introduced “mud-meters” to better track losses and reportedly held contractors accountable to permit requirements. As part of his responsibilities, Weed said “I checked the water meters, drilling mud, and additives. I would check the approved list to make sure any additives used were approved by the DEP.” Weed confirmed that after Larson was fired, Eric DeLong took over reporting to the DEP. Weed mentioned that drilling was allowed to continue if vacuum trucks were in place during the event of an IR. |
9/29/2022 | Jacob Bernard Rievel | Environmental Inspector | He reported that in the event of an IR or LOC, drilling would stop and the problem would be evaluated. He described an IR that occurred at Houston DD #7 as “…an IR into a wetland, which ran over some rocks and into a storm-water retention pond, along Rt. 576. We cleaned it out with vac- trucks.” Rievel did not recall any directive to minimize IRs to avoid work stoppages and that if IR reports were not accurate, Eric DeLong would have been responsible. He also mentioned that he personally observed animosity between the HDD Inspectors and the drilling contractors on the project, stating “The HDD guys were know-it-all types. They didn’t like the way that Ellingson was operating.” |
10/5/2022 | Kenneth Brooks Davidson | third-party manager for Health Safety Security and Environmental (HSSE) on the Shell Falcon Project | Davidson was the immediate supervisor of Mary Gerschefski, who he identified as the employee responsible for environmental oversight. He reported that he was never asked to investigate any reporting irregularities, non-reporting, or under-reporting of IRs and/or LOCs. He recalled “At the Minnesota Limited Level, on the pipeline construction, the standards were so much higher than what those guys were used to, and there were lots of instances or issues about the inspectors or public safety professionals telling them that things weren’t right. They had never been required to work under such demanding specifications.” |
11/15/2022 | Sashanna Rial Tabaka (AKA (Sasha Steele) | Environmental Inspector | She reported directly to Eric DeLong and submitted daily reports documenting workday activities and waste manifests. She was trained on the IR plan by Sean Larson and DeLong and considered herself experienced regarding HDD. She recalled ensuring that the necessary materials were onsite in the event of an IR or LOC, stating that this included “Anything that would be used to contain an IR as quickly as possible. I would go a little farther, with my experience as a mud-tech. I would look at the additives to make sure they weren’t trying to sneak in any un-approved additives, and I would look at the returns pit to see if there was any oil on top of it, which would indicate a leak. I knew what to look for, so it was helpful.” She described the Falcon’s path as “…a challenging area to drill. The area had mining voids, fractures, sand, and rock, a little bit of everything.” She denied being familiar with the terms “controlled” or “managed” release but did acknowledge that it was common practice to continue drilling as long as the IR was contained with vacuum trucks. She expressed concerns about the performance of Ellingson Trenchless, citing issues such as inexperience, shifting drillers between rigs, taking longer to set up drill rigs, and lack of sufficient equipment. When describing Ellingson Superintendent Kurt Peterson who Larson later removed from the project, she said “He made up his own rules.” |
11/15/2022 | Mary Garza Gerschefski | HSSE Manager for the Shell Falcon Project | She was involved in the contractor selection process and reiterated the responsibilities of key employees as described by other testimonies. She stated that she first heard the term “managed” or “controlled” release by Casey Talento of AECOM, and described the surprise of the DEP when they first heard the term. Gerschefski stated that any second or subsequent IR should have required a work stoppage and notification to the DEP. |
12/1/2022 | Anthony Jerome Bourassa | HDD Inspector | He described the IR Plan as “…a nightmare which nobody understood. It evolved and got worse due to the revisions to the plan. In the event of an IR, we were supposed to stop, take pictures, and wait for a re-start. We were required to take 20 pictures per day. The problem with the plan, or the rules per say, was nobody went through it.” He stated that in the event of a LOC, it was treated as an IR because an LOC will most likely lead to an IR. Bourassa criticized Ellingson Trenchless for lacking the necessary experience and knowledge for the project and for not appreciating suggestions from the Utility Inspectors. He also noted that the contract favored Ellingson Trenchless, as they received stand-by pay during shutdowns and “There was no motivation to do the right thing.” He recalled that inspectors suspected Ellingson was hiding LOCs and that was why Sean Larson installed a water meter to monitor usage. Bourassa mentioned that disputes over the size of IRs were common, with Ellingson wanting to minimize IRs. He denied falsifying documents and disagreed with the term “managed” or “controlled” release, stating that if there’s a release, it’s not controlled and it happened inadvertently. |
12/7/2022 | Phillip Mateusz Oleskiak | Chief Inspector for the Shell Falcon Project | Described the extent of his involvement with HDD Inspectors as signing Sean Larson’s timesheet. Oleskiak confirmed that there were conversations with Minnesota Limited LLC about shutdowns and the costs associated with stand-by pay. |
12/7/2022 | Scott Jay Adams | Project Engineering Manager for the Shell Falcon Pipeline | Adams reviewed the design of the pipeline, which was completed by AECOM, and was concerned about the Falcon Pipeline route due to its passage through a historic dump and numerous environmentally sensitive areas. He stated that the geology in PA with its fractures, layers, and lack of cohesion made the HDD process more difficult compared to previous projects he had worked on in states including TX, LA, and CA. He remembered “Sean didn’t like Ellingson from the beginning. I’m not sure why.” Adams conveyed that he believed that Shell followed the IR plan but he was not involved in its creation or enforcement. |
12/7/2022 | Melvin Douglas Scott Jr. (AKA Doug Scott) | Project Manager for the Shell Falcon Pipeline | He led the managers of the project from either PA or TX, reducing the amount of time he was in PA over time. Scott identified elevation changes in PA as a significant challenge for the project. Scott indicated that he was not involved in the day-to-day operations of the pipeline, but was alerted to any LOC or IR incidents. He also mentioned a rule of “three to agree” for reporting LOCs or IRs, involving agreement between someone from Minnesota Limited, Ellingson, and a HDD Inspector. Scott admitted knowing that required equipment such as real-time data loggers and water meters were missing from HDD rigs, but denied that he was familiar with the term “managed” or “controlled” release and said that he had never read the IR Plan. |
12/8/2022; 1/18/2023 | Unnamed | DEP Supervisor from the Waterways and Wetlands Program at the SWRO | The Supervisor indicated that Shell’s documentation included three incidents that were not reported to the DEP by Sean Larson and Eric DeLong. The DEP also noted that Shell failed to submit weekly reports once DeLong took over the reporting requirements, an issue that was later addressed and resolved. In a second interview the DEP pointed out three additional incidents that Shell failed to report. |
1/20/2023 | Paul William Leisteen | HDD Inspector | He described his training for the position, which included a deep dive into the IR and HDD Plans and how to respond to IRs and environmental inspections. He noted that Ellingson Trenchless, while not incompetent, handled things differently than other companies and seemed inexperienced. He recalled multiple IRs and LOCs at several locations. At one occasion he recalled that his immediate supervisor Lane Greenwalt, who took over after Sean Larson was fired, instructed drilling to continue despite a continuous IR, and “It didn’t make any sense to me that we had another 250 gallons of mud come up. We measure it, it was reported, and the mud keeps coming out. I asked specifically if we could have more mud come up and it was okay. Lane said yes.” He described the mud from an IR as being contained and collected with a vacuum truck, then taken back to a mud pit and re-circulated. Leisteen stated that he accurately reported the numbers provided to him by Sasha Steele in the Fluid Circulation Report. Since the IRs were incremental with less than 400 gallons of mud on the ground at any one time, he stated “It sounds a lot worse than it was in reality.” He denies being instructed to cover-up, lie, or withhold information. |
1/25/2024 | Jeremy Ellingson, Alfredo Padilla, Curt Peterson, Robert Hotz, Michael Schibursky | Chief Operations Officer, Operations Superintendents, and Project Managers of Ellingson Trenchless | They acknowledged the challenging terrain and geology in PA but stated that 75% of their work had previously been in PA. They considered their system to manage IRs on the Falcon to be better than any other job they had done in PA. Ellingson Trenchless was a subcontractor for Minnesota Limited and predominantly interacted only with them (not the DEP). They stated that water meters were required from the start of the project and the project did not start until they were in place. Ellingson confirmed that they were provided some stand-by pay for 10-12 day shutdowns but that it wasn’t much and sometimes they did not receive it. They acknowledged the 5,000 fluid loss limit, but recounted that if they were getting close to the threshold for the day, they were to ask for permission to get another 5,000 threshold to continue (which they called a re-set). They stated that they had not heard of the terms “managed” or “controlled” release as it had been described by others on the project. They said Sasha Steele and Eric DeLong gave instructions that allowed drilling to continue as long as continuous IRs were controlled. |
2/6/2024 | Clark Cogburn | Drilling superintendent for
Ellingson Trenchless |
He performed a total of six HDDs on the project. When asked to compare the IR prevalence on the Falcon project compared to other pipelines, Cogburn noted “It was a little above average. There were more IRs on this project. Anyone who tells you that you’re going to do HDDs in Pennsylvania and you’re not going to have IRs is telling you a blatant lie. It’s really bad from Pittsburgh, PA south to the state line.” He described Shell’s procedure for dealing with LOCs, and Cogburn confirmed the occurrence of a continuous, ongoing IR on the Houston #1 site near the exit side. He stated “…if we had an IR, we would immediately stop and clean it up. Ellingson would never call a state official. That was up to Shell to do that.” |
2/13/2024 | Eric Russell Skonberg | founder of HDD Consulting firm Trenchless Engineering | He was hired by Mary Garza Gerschefski as a third party HDD specialist in 2016 to opine on the feasibility of some of the HDD designs. He stated that the geology in PA, characterized by fractures, voids, and folding, made the HDD process more difficult. Skonberg received Inspector Reports and Daily Reports, in addition to drilling data and records of mud testing. He stated that there were IRs on this project and that they were following protocols to contain and report them. When a LOC was noticed, “…we would shut-down the pumps, stop drilling, and trip-out of the hole. We would notify Shell Environmental. I didn’t hear anyone saying we should look the other way. We would make remediation suggestions.” |
2/15/2024 | Dalton (Dino) Darden | Ellingson Trenchless employee | He encountered several problems on the project, including small drill sites, “frack-outs,” slow drilling that put the project behind schedule, and what he called “incorrect mud mix” which he explained saying “What I mean is the drill cuttings were not coming up. You want the drill cuttings to come up so you don’t fill your hole with cuttings.” Darden noted that there were times that Ellingson was hesitant to report IRs and LOCs due to being behind schedule. He mentioned that Sean Larson, who he respected for his drilling knowledge, was replaced by Lane Greenwalt, who was less mature and not a great communicator. Darden confirmed the occurrence of a “controlled IR” on the Houston #1 site, which they continued drilling despite. He stated that the decision to continue drilling would have come directly from Eric DeLong, who was responsible for reporting IRs and LOCs to the DEP. |
Sourced from the April 2024 Criminal Complaint.
Chamberlain named HDD Environmental Lead Eric DeLong and the HDD Coordinator Sean Larson as the main entities responsible for under-reporting IRs and LOCs. When interviewed, Larson confirmed that he had been responsible for reporting IRs and LOCs to the DEP until he was fired from the project in September 2019 for what he believes was being “…too open and honest with the DEP,” although he also admits to yelling and using obscenities when addressing a fellow employee. Larson said that Eric DeLong and the Shell Project Manager Doug Scott instructed him to underreport to the DEP. Eric DeLong took over incident reporting to the DEP after Larson was fired.
The testimonies from the investigation suggest that Shell and its associates intentionally underreported or failed to report IRs and LOCs during HDD operations for the Falcon Pipeline. IRs and LOCs were potentially hidden to avoid shutdowns that would cost Shell approximately $40,000/day in stand-by pay to Ellingson Trenchless contractors according to multiple interviewees. DEP staff indicated that the maximum amount that they could fine Shell for project violations was $10,000/day, which would make it less costly to pay fines than stand-by pay. There may have been an attempt to introduce unapproved terms like “controlled release” to avoid accountability for continued drilling despite multiple and/or continuous releases at the same location, though the origin of this phrase is unclear. Some interviewees reported that a vacuum truck was used to clean up unreported spills to allow drilling to continue. Tensions seemed high between HDD Inspectors and Ellingson Trenchless contractors when it came to the implementation of the IR plan. The elevation changes and geology of Pennsylvania seem to have challenged the project, and Ellingson Trenchless reportedly lacked experience in the region and was not accustomed to Pennsylvania’s regulations.
Lingering Questions
There are several lingering questions concerning the pipeline’s construction. We know that spills were not confined to Pennsylvania during the project. For example, there are documented significant HDD difficulties that occurred when the HDD team attempted to cross Wolf Run Creek in Jefferson County, Ohio. This location is of significant concern due to its proximity to an inactive coal mine. According to the 2020 public records request, 15 LOCs totaling 73,414 gallons and two IRs totalling 35 gallons occurred in Ohio. So far, no news has revealed whether the pipeline’s construction will be investigated in Ohio or West Virginia. In 2021, FracTracker and other partners wrote a letter asking state regulators in Ohio and West Virginia to investigate incidents that occurred during the construction of the Falcon and their impacts on water resources. The responses from the agencies indicated that they did not plan to follow through on the request.
Another question concerns the potentially defective corrosion coating protection on the pipes used to construct the Falcon Pipeline. PHMSA investigated this issue briefly in 2019 after complaints from Chamberlin and stated that they did not find deficiencies in the coating. DEP Secretary Patrick McDonnell wrote PHMSA a letter indicating that the DEP thought that this investigation was incomplete. A review of PHMSA’s enforcement actions web page shows two subsequent cases concerning the Falcon Pipeline. A case initiated on July 16, 2020, requested amendments to Shell’s procedures concerning written standards for visual pipeline inspection, addressing proximity to buildings and homes, and actions to be taken if coating damage was observed during HDD, as well as inadequate welding procedures. The second case initiated on July 16, 2021 resulted in the issuance of a warning and fine to Shell Pipeline Company LP concerning Pipeline Safety Regulations for support of coated pipe during handling. PHMSA noted two instances in Potter Township, Pennsylvania where coated pipe supported on skids was not properly padded. No further investigations have been conducted by PHMSA, and it is unclear whether the risk of coating deficiency has been fully addressed.
The Falcon Pipeline carries 107,000 barrels of liquid ethane per day across 25 municipalities in three states, meaning a pipeline leak could lead to devastating consequences. There are 550 family residences, 20 businesses, 240 groundwater wells, 12 public parks, five schools, six daycare centers, and 16 emergency response centers within potential risk areas. Concentrated ethane is very dangerous, as it is highly flammable, potentially explosive when mixed with air, and may cause frostbite or cryogenic burns and displace oxygen leading to suffocation. A leak would allow the colorless and odorless gas to spread, and triggers such a car ignition could cause an explosion.
Finally, there are certain questions that remain concerning details mentioned in the testimonies. Both Todd Weed and Sasha Steele recall checking the additives that were used to drill to “make sure they weren’t trying to sneak in any un-approved additive,” according to Steele. This begs the question of how often un-approved additives may have been successfully “sneaked in” and what they might have contained. Dalton Darden mentioned that an “incorrect mud mix” was used, but did not elaborate on what he meant besides saying that the incorrect mix did not allow drill cuttings to resurface. Doug Scott mentions that he was unfamiliar with the terms “managed” or “controlled” release, but FracTracker has documents from December 2019 that he is cc’d on that describe activity at a “controlled release point.” Despite the much clearer picture that these testimonies present, it is still uncertain whether the whole story has been told.
Hearing
The charges were brought to Magisterial District Judge Louis McQuillan’s office in Washington County, Pennsylvania. Once the validity of the charges are confirmed at the magisterial level, the case may move to another court. The amount of testimony that references specific employees might suggest that there will be consequences for individuals. If Shell is found guilty, this case could represent a shift in the political landscape and lead to higher consequences for future misconduct from Shell or make it harder for them to receive permits.
Conclusions
The criminal charges brought against Shell Pipeline Company LP reflect irresponsible practices that occurred during the Falcon Pipeline’s construction. The final consequences for Shell and its contractors remains unclear. The preliminary hearing at the Magisterial District Court was scheduled for May 30, 2024, but has been rescheduled for August 1, 2024, at 9:15 a.m.
References
Where to Learn More
- Shell Falcon Pipeline Charged with Failures to Report Drilling Issues that Caused Industrial Waste, Potential Pollution of Water – PA Office of Attorney General
- The Falcon Public EIA Project | FracTracker Alliance
- Falcon Pipeline Construction Releases over 250,000 Gallons Drilling Fluid | FracTracker Alliance
- Falcon Pipeline Online, Begins Operations Following Violations of Clean Streams Law | FracTracker Alliance
From Our Allies
In the News
- Attorney General files criminal charges against Shell on whistleblower reports over pipeline spills (www.alleghenyfront.org)
- Shell Falcon Pipeline charged for violating Pennsylvania environmental law (cbsnews.com)
- Whistleblowers say ‘bad seeds’ undermine pipeline safety (eenews.net)
- Falcon whistleblowers ‘fired for reporting’ hazards, complaint says (timesonline.com)
- Shell Pipeline Co. to pay $670K for Falcon violations in western PA (timesonline.com)
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First, Erica Kasundra is Sean’s wife, therefore not a credible witness. Second she filed her ethics complaint AFTER Sean was fired. Interesting you would think if they were so concerned with things being wrong they would have done the right thing sooner right? Nah. She was also let go mind you.
Not the first time Sean admitted to not reporting spills btw. The jackass is covering his ass for he himself doing this, not under anyone else’s direction.
https://www.desmog.com/2020/06/15/shell-falcon-pipeline-construction-pandemic-permits/
He was also reported to the EPA/DNR for burying toxic materials on his mothers property back in 2007. Statute of limitations expired when the neighbor reported it. Sean is a criminal. Recently had criminal convictions sealed with MN new expungement law helping him out.